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Abstract. In the original model of pure price competition, Bertrand
(1883), ﬁrms have linear cost functions. For any number n ≥ 2 of identical
such price-setting ﬁrms, the unique equilibrium price equal the ﬁrms’ (constant)
marginal cost. This paper provides a generalization of Bertrand’s model from
linear to convex cost functions. I analyze pure price competition both in a static
setting - where the ﬁrms interact once and for all - and in dynamic setting -
where they interact repeatedly over an indeﬁnite future. Suﬃcient conditions
are given for the existence of Nash equilibrium in the static setting and for
subgame perfect equilibrium in the dynamic setting, and the equilibrium sets
are characterized. It is shown that there typically exists a whole interval of
equilibrium prices both in the static and dynamic setting. Firms may earn





In the original model due to Joseph Bertrand (1883), ﬁr m sh a v el i n e a rc o s tf u n c -
tions. For any number of identical such price-setting ﬁrms, the unique equilibrium
price equal the ﬁrms’ (constant and common) marginal cost. Hence, under pure
competition, already two competitors is enough to obtain the perfectly competitive
outcome, despite the fact that each ﬁrm has a lot of market power; the slightest uni-
lateral price cut will rob all competitors of their entire demand. Francis Edgeworth
(1925) pointed out that, except in the case of linear costs, there are serious existence
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problems in Bertrand’s model of pure price competition if marginal costs are not con-
stant. Edgeworth proposed, in particular, a stark modiﬁcation of Bertrand’s model
in which ﬁrms have zero marginal cost and a ﬁxed capacity. He showed that, un-
less demand is highly elastic, pure-strategy equilibrium may then fail to exist. Eric
Maskin (1986) and Beth Allen and Martin Hellwig (1986) showed that mixed strategy
equilibria may nevertheless exist. However, mixed equilibria in price competition do
not appear convincing as models of many real-life market interactions. For although
price-setting is a common practice, most ﬁrms do not appear to use randomization
devices when setting their prices.1 Given the prevalence of price setting, models of
pure-strategy equilibrium in price competition are called for.
This paper provides a generalization of Bertrand’s model from linear to convex cost
functions. More exactly, I here analyze price competition in a homogeneous product
market among a ﬁxed number of price-setting ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm is characterized by
its (continuous, non-decreasing and convex) cost function. Two distinct settings
are analyzed. The ﬁrst is a one-shot interaction in which all ﬁrms simultaneously
set their prices and where each ﬁrm is committed to serve the demand it faces.
Such commitment is mandated in some regulated industries, such as electricity and
telephone, and is sometimes supported by consumer protection laws. Consumers
observe all prices and buy only from those sellers who ask the lowest price. In the
second setting studied here, this interaction is repeated an inﬁnite number of times,
with demand regenerated anew each period.
The main results are as follows. First, suﬃcient conditions are given for the
existence of Nash equilibrium in the ﬁrst setting and for subgame perfect equilibrium
in the second. Second, it is shown that, unlike in the classical case of linear cost
functions, the equilibrium outcome is not necessarily competitive. While marginal-
cost pricing indeed may be a Nash equilibrium, typically there exists a whole interval
of Nash equilibrium prices, both above and below the marginal-cost price. The
intuition is that with strictly convex costs, price undercutting is less proﬁtable than
with linear costs–since serving the whole market is more than proportionately costly
than serving a fraction thereof. Hence, also prices above marginal cost are possible
in equilibrium. Thirdly, by way of comparative static analysis in two cases, it is
shown that ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts in the one-shot interaction may increase when
their production costs go up. This is true even if they price at marginal cost. The
intuition is again convexity: the marginal cost may rise more than average cost.
1For an analysis of so-called Edgeworth cycles as perfect Markov equilibria involving randomiza-
tion, see Maskin and Tiole (1988). Noel (2004) reports empirical support for such phenomena.PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 3
Hence, producers’ and consumers may disagree as to the desirability of technological
progress. Fourthly, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium prices is characterized
and it is shown how the subgame perfection condition is nested in a simple way with
the condition for Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game. Thus, insights from the
static Nash equilibrium analysis can readily be carried over to the dynamic case.
This is not the ﬁrst study of pure-strategy equilibrium among price-setting ﬁrms
with convex costs. Grossman (1981) and Hart (1985) developed so-called supply
function equilibria, that is competition between ﬁrms that simultaneously commit
to whole supply schedules, that is, functions that assign a price to each possible
quantity supplied. Such models have a plethora of equilibria and many of these
rely on non-credible threats. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) generalize this set-up to
stochastic demand. They model a one-shot interaction between two identical ﬁrms,
and provide suﬃcient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria.
Dastidar (1995) analyzes one-shot interaction among price-setting ﬁrms, just as here,
and provides conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria. See also Vives (1999),
who brieﬂy discuss one-shot interaction among identical price-setting ﬁrms. However,
I have found no reference to pure-strategy equilibria in repeated interaction between
price-setting ﬁrms with convex costs. This paper is intentionally short and restricted
to certain relatively simple questions within the given framework. The purpose is
to stimulate more research and debate about the nature of price competition, both
from a positive and normative perspective. More complicated questions and many
relevant extensions have to be left for future work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model, section 3 gives an
analysis of the one-shot interaction and section 4 of the inﬁnitely repeated interaction.
Welfare aspects are studied in section 5, section 6 elaborates a parametric speciﬁcation
of the model, and section 7 suggests directions for future research.
2. The model
Suppose there are n ﬁrms in a market for a homogenous good. The market operates
over an inﬁnite sequence of time periods, t =0 ,1,2,.... Aggregate demand in each
period is given by a continuous and non-increasing demand function D : R+ → R+
with limp→+∞ D(p)=0 .
All ﬁrms simultaneously set their prices at the beginning of each period and are
committed to provide the quantity demanded at that price during the period. Let
pit ≥ 0 be ﬁrm i0s price in period t. All consumers observe all posted prices and buy
from the ﬁrm(s) with the lowest price. The lowest price in any period will be calledPRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 4
the market price in that period,
pt =m i n {p1t,...,p nt}.( 1 )
If more than one ﬁrm posts the market price, then sales are split equally between
these. Firm i produces the good at cost Ci (qi),w h e r eqi is its output quantity, and
where Ci : R+ → R+ is continuous, non-decreasing and convex. All ﬁrms are risk
neutral and discount future proﬁts by the same discount factor δ ∈ (0,1) between
successive market periods. Resale is not possible. The good is non-storable.











This is the proﬁtt h a tt h eﬁrm will make in a period when all ﬁrms post the same
price p.T h e industry proﬁtf u n c t i o nis deﬁned as the sum of all ﬁrms’ proﬁts when














For each ﬁrm i,l e ti t smonopolistic proﬁt function ˆ πi : R+ → R be deﬁned by
ˆ πi (p)=pD(p) − Ci [D(p)].
This is the proﬁtt h a tt h eﬁrm would make in a period were it to post the price p


















ˆ πi (p) ≤ nπi (p)+( n − 1)Ci (0)
for each ﬁrm i and any price p.I n p a r t i c u l a r , ˆ πi (p) ≤ nπi (p) in the absence of ﬁxed
costs, and ˆ πi (p)=nπi (p) in the classical case of constant average and marginal cost
(Ci linear).
Throughout this study, I make two assumptions with regard to the functions πi
and ˆ πi.T h e ﬁrst assumption is that each function ˆ πi is quasi-concave and obtains
its maximum at a ﬁnite price:PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 5
[C1] ∀i: ˆ πi is quasi-concave with ˆ Pi =a r gm a x p≥0 ˆ πi (p) non-empty.
In other words, each ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is unimodal and its monopoly price
ﬁnite. Let ˆ p be the minimal such monopoly price across all ﬁrms: ˆ p =m i n ∪i ˆ Pi.2
Heuristically, ˆ p is the monopoly price of the “largest” ﬁrm. It follows from [C1] that
all functions ˆ πi are non-decreasing on [0, ˆ p], a property that turns out to be analyti-
cally convenient. The second assumption is that there exist prices, not exceeding ˆ p,
at which the industry proﬁt is positive:
[C2] Π(p) > 0 for some p ∈ [0, ˆ p].
This set-up contains the classical Bertrand model as a special case and has the
Bertrand-Edgeworth model as a limiting case, with the important proviso that here
ﬁrms are, by assumption, committed to serve the demand they face. The classical
Bertrand model–constant marginal and average costs–here corresponds to all cost
functions being linear: Ci (q) ≡ ciq for some ci ≥ 0. In order to obtain Edgeworth’s
model–zero marginal cost up to a certain capacity and thereafter inﬁnite cost–ﬁrst
let the cost function of each producer i be
Ci (q) ≡ ki + c · max{0,q− Ki}, (4)
for some ﬁxed costs ki ≥ 0 and capacities Ki > 0. Edgeworth’s model is reached in
the limit as c → +∞.
3. One-shot interaction
Suppose that the interaction takes place only once. Suppose also that each ﬁrm has
t h eo p t i o no fl e a v i n gt h em a r k e t . L e tt h ev a l u eo ft h i so u t s i d eo p t i o nt oe a c hﬁrm
be normalized to zero. A pure strategy for a ﬁrm is a pair (si,p i) ∈ {0,1}×R+,
where si =1means that ﬁrm i stays in the market. The total number of ﬁrms that
participate in the market is thus m =
P
si. W eh e r ei n v e s t i g a t eN a s he q u i l i b r i ai n
which all ﬁrms participate in the market and they all set the same price.
The set of such “symmetric” equilibria is characterized by two conditions. First,
each ﬁrm’s proﬁt should not be below its’ outside option, and, secondly, unilateral
price under-cutting should be unproﬁtable:
πi (p) ≥ max{0,v i (p)} ∀i,( 5 )
2Each of the constituent sets is closed and bounded from below. Being ﬁnitely many, their union
is also closed and bounded from below and hence contains its inﬁmum.PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 6
where
vi (p)=s u p
p0<p
ˆ πi (p




deﬁnes a continuous function vi : R+ → R.3 Ap r i c ep satisfying condition (5) will
be called a (symmetric Nash) equilibrium price, and the (possibly empty) set of such
prices will be denoted PNE ⊂ R+.
Equilibrium prices above the minimal individualistic monopoly price are impos-
sible, so the focus of the equilibrium analysis is, without loss of generality, on prices
in the interval [0, ˆ p].F o r m a l l y :
Lemma 1. PNE ∩ (ˆ p,+∞)=∅.
Proof:L e tﬁrm i be such that ˆ pi =ˆ p and suppose that all ﬁrms price at some
price p>ˆ p.T h e n ﬁrm i produces and sells a quantity qi <D(p). By assumption,
D is continuous with limp→+∞D(p)=0 . Hence, there exists a price p∗ >psuch
that D(p∗)=qi. It follows that
ˆ πi (p
∗)=p
∗qi − Ci (qi) >p q i − Ci (qi).
However, by deﬁnition, ˆ πi (ˆ p) ≥ ˆ πi (p∗).M o r e o v e r , ˆ p<p ,s oﬁrm i can make a
proﬁtable unilateral deviation to ˆ p<p .H e n c e , p/ ∈ PNE. End of proof.
It follows from [C1] that a price p ∈ [0, ˆ p] is an equilibrium price if and only if it
delivers a proﬁtt oe a c hﬁrm that weakly exceeds the proﬁtt h a tt h eﬁrm would have
e a r n e dh a di ts e r v e dt h ew h o l em a r k e ta tt h a tp r i c e : 4
Proposition 1. p ∈ PNE if and only if πi (p) ≥ max{0, ˆ πi (p)} ∀i.



















The following result establishes existence of equilibrium in the special case of
identical ﬁrms without ﬁxed costs. Indeed, it goes beyond that claim and establishes
the existence of a zero-proﬁt equilibrium in that case.
3The second equality in this equation follows by continuity of ˆ πi, and the claimed continuity of
the value function vi follows from Berge’s maximum theorem.
4By [C1], each function ˆ πi is non-decreasing on [0, ˆ p],s ovi (p)=ˆ πi (p) for all p ≤ ˆ p.PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 7
Proposition 2. If ﬁrms are identical with C (0) = 0,t h e n∃p0 ∈ PNE with π(p0)=
0.
Proof: A c c o r d i n gt o[ C 2 ] ,Π(p) > 0 for some p ∈ [0, ˆ p].S i n c eΠ(0) = −nC (0) ≤
0 and Π is continuous, there exists a p0 ∈ [0,p) such that Π(p0)=−(n − 1)C (0).
But then p0D(p0)=nC [D(p0)/n]−(n − 1)C (0) ≤ C [D(p0)] by Jensen’s inequality
applied to C. Hence, ˆ π(p0) ≤ 0 and thus p0 ∈ PNE if C (0) = 0. End of proof.
In the classical Bertrand model, the condition for symmetric Nash equilibrium
boils down to p = ci for all i. Such equilibria thus exist if and only if ﬁrms are
identical, and the unique symmetric equilibrium price then equals the common con-
stant marginal cost. In order to relate to the Bertrand-Edgeworth model, consider
a duopoly with identical ﬁrms with cost functions as in equation (4). It is easily
veriﬁed from the above analysis that any price p such that K<D(p) ≤ 2K then is
a symmetric Nash equilibrium price, granted k is low enough and c high enough:




and π ≥ 0 if and only if pD(p) ≥ 2k. In the limit as c → +∞, the inequality π ≥ ˆ π
is met. Hence, then any price p such that K<D (p) ≤ 2K and pD(p) ≥ 2k is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium price.
4. Infinitely repeated interaction
Suppose that the oligopoly faces the same demand function D in each period. We
here consider the possibility for prices p ∈ [0, ˆ p] above the one-shot Nash equilibrium
prices to be sustainable in subgame perfect equilibrium in the inﬁnitely repeated
game by trigger strategies of the following sort: all ﬁrms initially ask the price p and
continue to do so as long as all ﬁrms quote this price. In the wake of any unilateral
price deviation, all ﬁrms switch to a price p∗ <pthat is a symmetric Nash equilibrium
price in the stage game. Such a trigger-strategy proﬁle constitutes a subgame perfect
equilibrium if and only if for all i:








where p∗ ∈ PNE, vi is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 6 ) ,a n dw h e r eπi (p∗) ≤ πi(p) for all i since
p∗ <p≤ ˆ p. The quantity on the left-hand side is the present value of the proﬁtt o
a ﬁrm that undercuts the collusive price optimally. Let the set of prices p ∈ [p∗, ˆ p]
satisfying (8), for some p∗ ∈ PNE be denoted PSPE (δ). In force of assumption [C1],
vi(p)=ˆ π(p) and hencePRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 8
Proposition 3. Suppose δ ∈ (0,1), p∗ ∈ PNE and p ∈ [p∗, ˆ p].T h e np ∈ PSPE (δ) if
and only if
πi(p) ≥ max{0,(1 − δ)ˆ πi(p)+δπi (p
∗)} ∀i. (9)
As is the case more generally, all Nash equilibrium prices in the one-shot game
are subgame perfect, for all δ (p∗ = p). It follows from assumption [C2] that if ﬁrms
are identical with no ﬁxed costs, then p∗ can be taken to result in zero proﬁts to all
ﬁrms and this is also the “harshest” trigger strategy possible, so
Proposition 4. Suppose ﬁrms are identical, C (0) = 0, δ ∈ (0,1) and p ∈ [0, ˆ p].
Then p ∈ PSPE (δ) if and only if
π(p) ≥ (1 − δ)max{0, ˆ π(p)}. (10)
Proof: By proposition 2, there exists a price p0 ∈ PNE with π (p0)=0 . Setting
p∗ = p0 in (9) shows that (10) is suﬃcient for p ∈ PSPE (δ). Secondly, assume that
p ∈ PSPE (δ).T h e n( 9 )h o l d sf o rs o m ep∗ ∈ PNE such that πi (p∗) ≤ πi(p) for all i.
B u tt h e ni ta l s oh o l df o rp0 ∈ PNE since π(p0)=0≤ πi (p) for all p ∈ PNE. End of
proof.
We note the similarity between the condition (??) for Nash equilibrium in the
one-shot game and the condition (10) in the inﬁnitely repeated game, in the case of
identical ﬁrms: the only diﬀerence being the factor 1 − δ ∈ (0,1).
We also note that a necessary condition for (10) to hold is:








pD(p) − nC [D(p)/n]
npD(p) − nC [D(p)]
≥
pD(p) − C [D(p)]





Hence, collusion is then “easier” than in the classical case of linear costs in the sense
that the range of discount factors δ satisfying the subgame perfection condition,
ceteris paribus, is a superset of that in the linear case. This is intuitively evident:
the deviating ﬁr ms e r v e st h ew h o l em a r k e ta n dh e n c eh a sam o r et h a np r o p o r t i o n a l l y
increased cost to deliver the demanded quantity if its cost function is strictly convex.PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 9
5. Welfare
Having studied conditions for a market price to be a symmetric Nash equilibrium
in a one-shot interaction as well as in the inﬁnitely repeated game with discounting,
I turn to the question of eﬃciency. For this purpose, deﬁne social welfare, at any
price p quoted by all ﬁrms, as the sum of consumer surplus and ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Thus,





It should be noted that this deﬁnition is restrictive and applies best in situations
when ﬁrms are quite similar. For it is focused on situations in which all ﬁrms are
active in the market, whether or not some ﬁrms make losses and whether or not it
would be socially desirable to shut some ﬁrms.
However, staying with the function W as our social welfare function, it follows
that, if the cost functions are diﬀerentiable, then a necessary condition for a common
























i [D(p)/n].( 1 1 )
This is a ﬁxed-point equation in p. For convex cost functions, the right-hand side
is non-increasing in p. Hence, there then exists at most one solution. If, moreover,
C0 and D are continuous functions, then existence is guaranteed. When a solution
to equation (11) exists, it will be denoted pmc.
6. A parametric specification
S u p p o s et h a td e m a n di s“ l i n e a r ”( m o r ep r e c i s e l y ,p i e c e - w i s ea ﬃne):
D(p)=m a x{0,1 − p},
and that ﬁrms have cost functions of the polynomial form
Ci (q)=ki + ciq + γiq
2/2,PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 10
where ki,γi ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ ci < 1 for all i.L e t ¯ c =
P
i ci/n and ¯ γ =
P
i γi/n. Hence,
for each producer i, ki is its ﬁxed cost and ci + γiq its marginal cost when operating
at any output level q ≥ 0.
The monopoly price for ﬁrm i (were it alone in the market) is
ˆ pi =
ci + γi +1
γi +2
.
It follows that ˆ pi ≥ 1/2 and ˆ pi >c i
5 Moreover,
ˆ p =m i n
i
ci + γi +1
γi +2
, (12)
with ˆ p ≥ 1/2 and ˆ p>mini ci. The condition (11) for marginal cost pricing gives
p
mc =
n¯ c +¯ γ
n +¯ γ
,( 1 3 )











2nci +( n +1 )γi
2n +( n +1 )γi
¸
.( 1 4 )
It follows by continuity that this set is non-empty if ﬁrms are suﬃciently similar
and have strictly convex cost functions with suﬃciently low ﬁxed costs:
Proposition 5. There exists δ>0 such that PNE 6= ∅ if maxi ki <δ , mini γi >δ ,
maxi6=j |ci − cj| <δand maxi6=j
¯ ¯γi − γj
¯ ¯ <δ .
Proof: Let n be ﬁxed. The set on the right-hand side of (14) is a closed interval









2nc +( n +1 )γ
2n +( n +1 )γ
= g(c,γ)
for k =0 ,a n yc ∈ [0,1), γ>0 and p<1. Moreover, we then also have
f (c,γ,0,p) <
c + γ +1
γ +2
=ˆ p.
5To see this, note that ˆ pi is increasing in γi, and note also that for γi =0 , ˆ pi is the mid-point
between ci and 1.PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 11
any c ∈ [0,1), γ>0 and p<1.L e t
p
+ =m i n{ˆ p,g(c,γ)}.
Clearly p+ < 1 and PNE ∩ [0, ˆ p]=[ f (c,γ,k,p),p +].B y c o n t i n u i t y , f (c,γ,k,p+) <
p+ for any c ∈ [0,1) and γ>0,g r a n t e dk>0 is suﬃciently small. The claim in the
proposition now follows by continuity of f, g and ˆ p, viewed as functions of parameters
ki,c i and γi. End of proof.
In the special case of linear costs (ki = γi =0 ), the equilibrium condition (14)
boils down to the requirement that p = ci for all i. Hence symmetric equilibrium
then occurs only if all ﬁrms have the same marginal cost, and the equilibrium price
equals this marginal cost. By equation (13), price competition then results in a
socially eﬃcient outcome.
However, this is in general not the case. To see this, suppose that ﬁxed costs are
absent and all ﬁrms are identical with strictly convex cost functions. Then the mar-
ginal cost price, pmc, belongs to the interior of the interval of symmetric equilibrium
prices:




2n¯ c +¯ γ
2n +¯ γ
,
2n¯ c +( n +1 )¯ γ
2n +( n +1 )¯ γ
¶
.
In other words, there exists a whole continuum of equilibrium prices, out of which
the marginal cost price is but one.
This algebraic analysis can be illustrated geometrically as follows. Figure 1 below
illustrates condition (10), for a ﬁrm i with ki = ci =0and γi =0 .2,w h e nn =3and
δ =0(one-shot interaction). The thick curve is the graph of πi, and the thin curve
the graph of ˆ πi. The thick curve intersects the x-axis at p0
i ≈ 0.05 and the thin curve
peaks at ˆ pi ≈ 0.58. The set of equilibrium prices for this ﬁrm is the small interval
where the thick curve exceeds both the thin curve and the horizontal axis, roughly
0.05 ≤ pi ≤ 0.22.I f a l l t h r e e ﬁrms are identical, then this is also the set PNE of
equilibrium prices, and in this case the socially optimal price is pmc =0 .2/1.7 ≈ 0.12.PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 12








Figure 1: The graphs of the two proﬁt functions in (10).
For positive δ, the thin curve is closer to the x-axis, and the diagram then shows,
likewise, the set of symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium prices in the inﬁnitely
repeated game. For δ suﬃciently large, the thin curve lies below the thick curve for
all p ∈ [p0, ˆ p], in which case PSPE consists of all such prices p. The dashed thin curve
is the graph of (1 − δ)ˆ π,d r a w nf o rδ =0 .6, in which case the interval of subgame
perfect equilibrium prices is approximately [0.05,0.47].
6.1. Comparative statics in costs. Suppose that ﬁrms are identical and price










It is noteworthy that this proﬁt is non-monotonic in γ, see Figure 3 below, showing
how the proﬁt depends on the cost parameter γ,f o rk,c and n ﬁxed. (Here k =0 ,
c =0 .3 and n =2 .)PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 13









Figure 2: Equilibrium proﬁt as a function of the cost parameter γ.
The diagram shows how the proﬁt increases with γ,f o ra l lγ<2. Hence, a
general reduction in production costs, for all ﬁrms (for example due to technological
progress) may be against the ﬁrms’ proﬁt interest. The reason is that a cost reduction
may reduce the equilibrium price so much that proﬁts fall. Hence, for certain cost
parameters, there is a conﬂict of interest between consumers and the ﬁrms concerning
technological progress in the production technology of ﬁrms. It may be noted that
the property is robust in the sense that in the absence of ﬁxed costs, equilibrium
proﬁts are zero when costs are linear (γ =0 ) but positive when costs are slightly
convex (γ>0 and small).
6.2. Asymmetric duopoly. Consider the case of a ﬁrm with a positive ﬁxed
cost and a positive and increasing marginal cost competing with a ﬁr màl aB e r t r a n d ,
that is, with constant marginal and average costs. Suppose, moreover, that the
second ﬁrm’s constant marginal cost is relatively high in comparison with the ﬁrst:
k1 ≥ k2 =0 , c1 <c 2 < 1 and γ1 >γ 2 =0 . Condition (14) then pins down
the symmetric Nash equilibrium price in the one-shot game: p = c2.I n s y m m e t r i c










(1 − c2) − k1 (15)PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 14
Suppose that the cost parameters are such that π1 (c2) ≥ 0. A necessary and
suﬃcient condition for p = c2 to constitute a symmetric Nash equilibrium is then
that π1 (c2) ≥ ˆ π1 (c2),o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,t h a t
2(c2 − c1) ≤ 3γ1 (1 − c2). (16)
Do such parameter combinations exist? For k1 = c1 =0 , the requirement on γ1







In other words, the convexity of the ﬁrst ﬁrm’s cost function should be moderate.
This condition is met, for instance, by γ1 =1and c2 =1 /2. It follows, by continuity,
that p = c2 constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium also for positive but suﬃciently
low values of k1 and c1. For instance, for γ1 =1and c2 =1 /2, the requirement on k1
and c1 is k1 ≤ 1/16 − c1/4.
Thus, symmetric Nash equilibria do exist for certain parameter combinations.
Moreover, for certain parameter combinations there also exists an asymmetric Nash
equilibrium, in which ﬁrm 1 sets p1 = c2 and ﬁrm 2 opts out (s2 =0 ). Then
ﬁrm 1 serves the whole market and earns proﬁts ˆ π1 (c2). This situation constitutes a
Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game if ˆ π1 (c2) ≥ 0. Note that if condition (16) is
met, then ﬁrm 1 does not earn a higher payoﬀ in this asymmetric equilibrium–where
it is a monopolist under the threat of a competitor’s entry–than in the symmetric
duopolistic equilibrium.
Secondly, consider the eﬀect of a change in ﬁrm 2’s marginal cost, c2,u p o nt h e
two ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the symmetric equilibrium. While ﬁrm 2’s proﬁti su n a ﬀected
by such a change–its proﬁt remains at zero–the equilibrium proﬁtt oﬁrm 1 rises,
granted c2 is below ﬁrm 1’s monopoly price:
∂π1
∂c2
> 0 ⇔ c2 < ˆ p1 =
c1 + γ1 +1
γ1 +2
. (17)
Hence, for such cost parameters, a technological innovation that decreases c2, without
aﬀecting ﬁrm 1’s cost function, would not be welcomed by ﬁr m1 ,s i n c ei tw o u l d
result in a lower market price and hence lower proﬁts. This is not so surprising.
More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that this would remain true for a range of cost
parameters, even if the technological innovation were to beneﬁt ﬁrm 1 to the same






> 0 ⇔ c2 <
c1 + γ1 +1 /2
γ1 +3 /2
, (18)PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 15
where the upper bound on c2 is (somewhat) lower than in (17). The condition in (18)
is met, for example, when γ1 =1 , c1 =0and c2 =1 /2; the parameter combination
discussed above.
7. Directions for further research
The above analysis is restrictive in many dimensions. Maybe the most apparent is its
focus on symmetric equilibria, that is, equilibria in which all ﬁrms are active in the
market. Asymmetric equilibria, where some ﬁrms opt out, as well as entry decisions
by ﬁrms, are important phenomena that should be analyzed. Of particular interest
for many applications is the case when one ﬁrm is much larger than the others. A
second restriction of the present analysis is that it does not include investment de-
cisions. What are the incentives for ﬁrms to investment in cost-reducing equipment
and technologies? The present comparative-statics analysis suggests that these in-
centives may be weak or even negative. A relevant extension of the present one-shot
interaction would thus be to consider a two-stage interaction, where ﬁrms invest in
s t a g eo n e . F o rt h es a k eo fr e a l i s mo n es h o u l dp r o b a b l ya l s oc o n s i d e rn o n - c o n v e x
(but still continuous and non-increasing) cost functions. Such non-convexities are
said to arise in the production of electricity; before a spare generator is turned on,
marginal cost goes up and after the generator has started spinning, marginal cost
again goes down. A forth relevant extension would be to consider periodic and/or
stochastic ﬂuctuations in demand. A ﬁfth extension would be to include the possi-
bility of incomplete information, that is, the realistic possibility that producers often
lack precise information about each others’ costs. A sixth extension would be to con-
sider markets where sellers can choose not to serve all the demand they face. This
possibility can turn otherwise unproﬁtable price deviations proﬁtable. In order to
analyze this possibility, some form of rationing scheme has to be deﬁned. A seventh,
and ﬁnal, extension of great relevance for some markets–and which goes somewhat
i nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o na st h ep r e c e d i n ge x t e n s i o n – w o u l db et oc o n s i d e rs i t u a t i o n si n
which sellers can pre-commit to whole supply schedules, that is, rules that prescribe
how much they are willing to supply at diﬀerent prices (see Grossman (1981), Hart
(1985) and Klemperer and Meyer (1989)).
It is well-known that all Nash equilibria in the classic case of identical ﬁrms with
linear costs are weakly dominated; in equilibrium at least two ﬁrms set their prices
equal to marginal cost, and while that is a best reply, it is weakly dominated by
any higher price at which demand is positive. By contrast, with strictly convex
costs, Nash equilibria are generically strict; a unilateral deviation causes a proﬁtl o s s .PRICE COMPETITION AND CONVEX COSTS 16
Moreover, based on arguments from the evolutionary game theory literature one may
conjecture that only the highest Nash equilibrium price is viable in the very long
run. For the highest Nash equilibrium price both Pareto dominates (in terms of the
players, here the producers) and risk dominates (again in terms of the players) any
other symmetric Nash equilibrium price, and it is known that recurrent play of 2×2
coordination games of this type (in large populations with boundedly rational agents
subject to perpetual strategy perturbations) leads to play of the Pareto dominant
equilibrium. To substantiate this conjecture requires a detailed analysis (including
a discretization of prices), which falls outside the scope of this short paper. If the
conjecture is correct, then the conclusion is that in the very long run, ﬁrms should
be expected to price at the maximal Nash equilibrium price, that is, well above the
perfectly competitive price.
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